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2	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
3	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
4	Case No. 09-50026 (REG)
5	x
6	In the Matter of:
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8	MOTORS LIQUIDATION COMPANY, et al.
9	f/k/a General Motors Corporation, et al.,
10	
11	Debtors.
12	
13	x
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15	United States Bankruptcy Court
16	One Bowling Green
17	New York, New York
18	
19	June 22, 2011
20	9:52 AM
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22	
23	BEFORE:
24	HON. ROBERT E. GERBER
25	U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

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2	HEARING re Debtors' 151st Omnibus Objection to Claims
3	(Claims For Equity Interests)
4	
5	HEARING re Debtors' 153rd Omnibus Objection to Claims
6	(Claims For Equity Interests)
7	
8	HEARING re Debtors' 155th Omnibus Objection to Claims
9	(Claims For Equity Interests)
10	
11	HEARING re Debtors' 156th Omnibus Objection to Claims
12	(Claims For Equity Interests)
13	
14	HEARING re Debtors' 179th Omnibus Objection to Claims
15	(Welfare Benefits Claims of Retired and Former Salaried and
16	Executive Employees)
17	
18	HEARING re Debtors' 210th Omnibus Objection to Claims
19	(Claims For Equity Interests)
20	
21	HEARING re Motions filed by Billy Kidwell
22	
23	HEARING re 221st Omnibus Objection to Claims
24	(Claims For Equity Interests)
25	

Page 3 1 2 HEARING re 222nd Omnibus Objection to Claims 3 (Duplicate Debt Claims) 4 5 HEARING re 223rd Omnibus Objection to Claims (Eurobond Deutsche Debt Claims) 7 HEARING re 224th Omnibus Objection to Claims 8 9 (No Liability GMAC Debt Claims) 10 11 HEARING re 225th Omnibus Objection to Claims 12 (Welfare Benefits Claims of Retired and Former Salaried and 13 Executive Employees) 14 15 16 HEARING re 226th Omnibus Objection to Claims 17 (Welfare Benefits Claims of Retired and Former Salaried and 18 Executive Employees) 19 20 21 HEARING re 227th Omnibus Objection to Claims 22 (Welfare Benefits Claims of Retired and Former Salaried and 23 Executive Employees) 24 25

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2	HEARING re 228th Omnibus Objection to Claims
3	(Qualified Defined Benefits Pension Benefits Claims and Welfare
4	Benefits Claims of Former Salaried, Executive or Hourly
5	Employees)
6	
7	HEARING re 229th Omnibus Objection to Claims
8	(Supplemental Benefits Claims of Retired and Former Salaried
9	and Executive Employees)
10	
11	HEARING re 230th Omnibus Objection to Claims
12	(Splinter Union Employee Claims Assumed by General Motors LLC)
13	
14	HEARING re 231st Omnibus Objection to Claims
15	(Qualified Defined Benefits Pension Benefits Claims of Former
16	and Salaried and Hourly Employees)
17	
18	HEARING re 232nd Omnibus Objection to Claims
19	(Claims Relating to Former Employees Represented by United Auto
20	Workers)
21	
22	HEARING re 233rd Omnibus Objection to Claims
23	(Supplemental Executive Retirement Benefits Claims of Former
24	Executive Employees)
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Page 5 1 2 HEARING re Application by AP Services, LLC as Crisis Mangers to 3 the Debtors for Approval of Discretionary Fees 4 5 HEARING re Motors Liquidation Company GUC Trusts' Objection to 6 Claim No. 10038 for Failure to Comply with Amended Order 7 Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 105(A) AND General Order M-390 Authorizing Implementation of Alternate Dispute Procedures, 8 9 Including Mandatory Mediation 10 HEARING re Motion for Objection to Claim(s) Number 39218, 11 12 39219, 39220, 39221 and 39222 for Failure to Comply with 13 Amended Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 105(A) AND General 14 Order M-390 Authorizing Implementation of Alternate Dispute 15 Procedures, Including Mandatory Mediation 16 17 HEARING re Motion for Relief from Stay filed by Steven R. Montgomery on behalf of The Roman Catholic Diocese of 18 19 Pittsburgh and Transfiguration Parish 20 21 HEARING re Motion to Approve Compromise Under Environmental 22 Laws of NRD Consent Decree filed by David S. Jones on behalf of 23 the United States of America 24 25 Transcribed by: Linda Ferrara

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Page 7 1 2 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRUSTEE 3 33 Whitehall Street 4 5 New York, New York 6 BY: BRIAN MASUMOTO, UST 7 8 TELEPHONICALLY: 9 DOMENICA DITTMEIER, In Propria Persona 10 MARK F. HASSON, III, In Propria Persona 11 DAVID McKINNEY, In Propria Persona 12 RUTH MEYER, In Propria Persona 13 LARRY P. SCHRAMM, In Propria Persona TERRIE SIZEMORE, In Propria Persona 14 15 KATHRYN J. SLADE, In Propria Persona EDMOND STERNIAK, Pro Se 16 17 RONALD TANCIAR, In Propria Persona 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

PROCEEDINGS

THE COURT: Have seats, please. Okay. We're here on General Motors, Motors Liquidation Corporation. I did get some last minute requests for continuances or at least one. The debtor can tell me whether it has a problem with that request. I would like to take Mr. Kidwell's issues last and just before them, the medical benefits terminations issues and deal with preliminaries first if we can.

Mr. Smolinsky, are you going to take the lead on behalf of the GM estate -- all of GM estate?

MR. SMOLINSKY: Good morning, Your Honor. Joseph Smolinsky of Weil Gotshal & Manges for the debtors and posteffective date debtors, as well as the Motors Liquidation Company, GUC Trust. Your Honor, I'm happy to go through the agenda as its currently constructed.

With respect to the letter that I believe is the one you're referring to from Sharon Bell requesting a continuance, that was a letter that hit the docket this morning. We have several claims matters that are on this morning that have been carried on the calendar for quite some time. And we recently filed replies in our efforts to start moving forward with those lingering objections.

Given the lapse of time, we didn't want to surprise anyone with a hearing, so we went out to each and every one of the claimants that we filed responses with respect to and gave

them the option of either going forward today or adjourning it to July 27. The default, if they did not respond, was to kick that hearing. So as far as I know, Sharon Bell is not on the calendar today. It's on the calendar for July 27 and we will notify --

THE COURT: So in substance, she got what she wanted.

MR. SMOLINSKY: That's right, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SMOLINSKY: So each of those matters that are on the calendar today, they have asked to be heard today.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SMOLINSKY: Your Honor, just a case update. Your Honor may have heard that recently Barry Seidel and Eric Fisher left the firm of Butzel Long and moved to Dickstein Shapiro.

And I trust that you'll be receiving substitution of counsel papers with respect to that move of the two matters that they were involved in.

THE COURT: I had not heard that. In other words, the same lawyers will be continuing to act on behalf of the creditors committee but for -- out of a different law firm?

MR. SMOLINSKY: That's correct, Your Honor. In connection with that move or as part of that move, we have also decided the GUC Trust to bring in Dickstein Shapiro as a cocounsel to create some efficiencies in the claims objection process. And in the court today is Stefanie Greer, a partner

at Dickstein Shapiro who will be very active in several of the claims matters going forward.

THE COURT: Okay. Welcome, Ms. Greer.

MR. SMOLINSKY: Your Honor, the first matter on the calendar today is the Terrie Sizemore matter. That was adjourned. We notified chambers of that adjournment. Matters two through six are omnibus objections to claims that all relate to claims by equity holders who have asserted claims for damages for a variety of reasons.

The first one on the calendar is the debtors' 151st omnibus objection. We're going to address the Hasson response today. Many of my comments with respect to Mr. Hasson's response are equally applicable to the other similar matters on the calendar. Mr. Hasson alleges fraud and misrepresentation to equity holders, basically alleging that GM didn't advise equity holders of the precarious financial condition that led to its ultimate bankruptcy and assert claims for damages relating to that misrepresentation.

Mr. Hasson doesn't assert any specific
misrepresentations to him but rather arguably
misrepresentations to the entire equity community. In any
event, Your Honor, Section 510(b) is clear and under Section
510(b) damages that arise from the sale or purchase of a
security are subordinated to the claims that arise in
connection with those securities.

But there's a specific section dealing with equity and I just want to read and paraphrase Section 510(b) because I think it's very important to the resolution of these matters.

510(b) says, Your Honor, "For the purpose of distribution under this title, a claim arising for damages arising from the purchase or sale of a security or for reimbursement or contribution allowed under Section 502 on account of such claim shall be subordinated to all claims or interest that are senior to or equal, the claim or interest represented by such security," and this is the important part, "except that if such security is common stock, such claim has the same priority as common stock."

So, Your Honor, if Mr. Hasson has a claim for damages arising from the purchase or sale of common stock, then his claim would be equal to that of other equity holders. Our confirmed Chapter 11 plan is consistent with the absolute priority rule and requires that unsecured creditors be paid in full before equity holders receive any distribution.

So we believe that the plan treats Mr. Hasson's claim consistent with those requirements and believe that Mr. Hasson's claim should be reclassified to its proper place as an equity claim.

THE COURT: Okay. My phone log indicates Mr. Hasson having signed up for the call. Mr. Hasson, are you on the phone?

Page 12 1 MR. HASSON: Yes, I am. 2 THE COURT: Would you like to argue? 3 MR. HASSON: You see, I couldn't hear a thing that 4 the attorney had said. I hadn't heard one thing. It was 5 I could make a statement at this time. 6 THE COURT: I'm going --7 MR. HASSON: Hello? 8 THE COURT: Just a minute. UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE SPEAKER: Are you talking to me? 10 THE COURT: I would like quiet on the line 11 temporarily. 12 Would one of my folks turn off all of the blowers 13 that are air conditioning the courtroom. 14 MR. HASSON: Hello? 15 THE COURT: Just a minute please, Mr. Hasson. Mr. 16 Hasson, we've now turned off all of the air conditioning in the 17 courtroom. Can you hear me now? 18 MR. HASSON: I can hear you pretty good; yes. 19 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Smolinsky, what I would 20 like you to do is to summarize the points that you made that 21 were particularly focused at Mr. Hasson. You had cited a 22 section of the Bankruptcy Code. I think it's 510(b) upon which 23 GM is objecting. 24 MR. SMOLINSKY: Yes. Mr. Hasson, can you hear me 25 now?

Page 13 1 THE COURT: Mr. Hasson? 2 MR. HASSON: I barely can hear him. 3 THE COURT: Pull the microphone very close to you, 4 Mr. Smolinsky. 5 MR. SMOLINSKY: Mr. Hasson, how is this? 6 MR. HASSON: That's fine. 7 MR. SMOLINSKY: Okav. THE COURT: Go ahead please, Mr. Smolinsky. 8 9 MR. SMOLINSKY: Mr. Hasson, as I noted to the Court, 10 your allegations relate to misrepresentations that you allege 11 were made by General Motors to the equity holders community. 12 And I cited to Section 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code which 13 states, "For the purpose of distribution under this title, a 14 claim arising from recision of a purchase or sale of a security 15 of the debtor or of an affiliate of thee debtor for damages 16 arising from the purchase or sale of such a security or the 17 reimbursement or contribution allowed under Section 502 on account of such claim shall be subordinated to all claims or 18 interest that are senior to such claims," -- I'm sorry -- "that 19 20 are senior to or equal, the claim or interest represented by 21 such security," and note, "except that if such security is 22 common stock, such security has the same priority as common 23 stock." 24 As I stated, Your Honor, we believe that the plan --25 the Chapter 11 plan that was confirmed in this case properly

prioritizes Mr. Hasson's claim as an equity claim which is equal to all other claims and junior to the claims of proper creditors in this case.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Hasson, I'll hear your argument, if you wish.

MR. HASSON: First off, there's somebody breathing in the phone. So, it's very --

THE COURT: I know. I have that problem all the time. I haven't found out what causes it. I will ask Court Call to mute everybody except Mr. Hasson and then after I've ruled on Mr. Hasson's argument, to free up other's ability to be heard. I know what you're talking about Mr. Hasson. All I can say is it frustrates me also. Go ahead with your argument, too please, sir.

MR. HASSON: Somebody else just said something.

THE COURT: Well I don't think they -- I didn't hear that and I don't see how they could have. It must have only been me speaking, Mr. Hasson.

MR. HASSON: Okay. You know, it's very hard again to hear what he said and there's always rules and different things I guess in the Bankruptcy Code, excuse me, of which I don't know anything about. That's why I went to an attorney, Bononi & Bononi, of Greensburg, Pennsylvania and I had them look over this. And they felt, as well as I did, also that we were or I was -- General Motors was wrong in what they did to me by not

letting us know how the company was doing when they were actually in dire straits. Okay?

Let me -- if you don't mind, can I back up a little bit on telling you about GM?

THE COURT: You can but I just want you to assume that I've read your papers, Mr. Hasson. So you don't need to repeat what you said then. I would find it most helpful if you respond to Mr. Smolinsky's contention that because you were a stockholder, the fact that you're claiming securities fraud even if it's true, wouldn't give you any more rights than a stockholder would otherwise have.

MR. HASSON: Well, GM didn't give us very many rights, all right, as a stockholder, being a salaried person in General Motors. To the point of where one day State Street Bank notified us and notified myself, that they had done away with our stock completely. We had nothing to say about it.

Okay? And it was our stock fund -- it was my pension fund, okay? So State Street Bank for the benefit of General Motors was just doing away with stock. You see, I used to stay with GM all these years because they always came through in the end. But now my hope was all gone because of what State Street Bank did and General Motors -- well, they handled General Motors stock. And the General Motors common stock fund was a fund that was, excuse me, approximately 93.11 percent GM common stock and it was 6.89 percent bonds. All right?

But the fact is whenever I said it was -- they
actually misrepresented themselves and that's what they did.
They misrepresented me completely -- themselves to me
completely, otherwise I would have gotten out of that thing
whenever it was twenty-five, thirty-five, forty dollars a
share.

So all your hearing is these people specifying
certain rules and regulations of the Bankruptcy Code but what
you have to do is take a look at what the people like myself
are -- you know, we're just a little person involved in this,
have gone through and what they've done to us. And I mean I
can't say much more except that's the way GM is. They took our
salary benefits away and I know they have nothing to do with

THE COURT: I understand.

salaried employees.

MR. HASSON: I don't know what else I could say, but say right in with what you want to answer his question.

this hearing today, but they've done everything to the retired

THE COURT: Fair enough. I understand, sir. Okay. Thank you.

MR. HASSON: You know it was my pension.

THE COURT: I well understand, Mr. Hasson.

Mr. Smolinsky, anything further?

MR. SMOLINSKY: No, Your Honor. We sympathize obviously with all of the parties who have lost money in this

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Page 17 1 case but I have nothing further to add. 2 THE COURT: Okay. 3 MR. SMOLINSKY: We are bound by the requirements of 4 the Bankruptcy Code. THE COURT: Okay. 5 6 MR. HASSON: It's very hard to Mr. Smolinsky. THE COURT: Mr. Smolinsky said in substance that he 7 sympathized with you and that there were other retirees who 8 were in the same boat and he sympathized with them as well. 10 But that he was bound by the requirements of the Bankruptcy Code. That isn't verbatim but that's the substance of what he 11 12 said. 13 MR. HASSON: So in other words, the people who had 14 faith in General Motors and stayed with General Motors are the 15 ones who get nothing from General Motors for being with them 16 all these years. 17 THE COURT: Okay. I'll speak to that in my ruling. Is there any other stockholder who wants to -- I should be 18 19 hearing now, Mr. Smolinsky? I know you have a number of 20 stockholder objections. I don't know if any of them asked to 21 be heard orally. 22 MR. SMOLINSKY: I'm happy to quickly run through them 23 and if you want to give one ruling with respect to all --24 THE COURT: Well, what I'd -- Mr. Hasson's argument 25 is a variant of the argument that applies to other stockholders

as well. Are there any other stockholders who you know of who said they wanted to argue today?

MR. SMOLINSKY: All of them wanted to go forward today. I suspect that that meant that they wanted to be heard. So I would open up the floor and I'll be happy to respond to anything that is different than Mr. Hasson's arguments.

THE COURT: Okay. Court Call would you live-in, if you will or activate everybody's phone access? And I want to ask if there is anybody on the phone who is in a stockholder situation who has either --

MS. DITTMEIER: I am a stockholder.

THE COURT: Okay. Would you like to argue, Miss?

MS. DITTMEIER: Yes, my name is Domenica Dittmeier.

I believe I am listed today.

THE COURT: Yes, you are, Ms. Dittmeier. I have you on my log.

MS. DITTMEIER: Yes, Judge, there are -- I just have a few points. I'm an eighty-five year old woman of limited income with a totally disabled eighty-eight year old husband and even -- we lost about thirty-two thousand which I recognize to some people isn't much but it is to us.

Now I'm seeking a partial return, whatever I can get on the following basis or one of the basis that I believe stockholders are creditors because the bank lends money, expects to get it back with interest, he's a creditor. The

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buyer sells, he's a creditor. The stockholders been doing exactly the same thing and he shouldn't be called anything but a creditor and he should have the same preference and priority as all other creditors.

Now I have never saw my money as a gift or a charity. General Motors never indicated otherwise and now they're trying to establish a definition to their benefit, so that we won't get anything. They want to call us equity interests. Well, we are stockholders and creditors. And they think by changing the definition, we can go to the very, very end of the line when there's absolutely not a penny left. And I don't think they should have the right to change definitions and to call us anything but what is generally assumed to be a lender, a creditor.

So on that basis, I would like to have the same priorities as any other creditor and not put at the very end of the line and for any other reason that Your Honor could see fit, I would like whatever portion you feel I am entitled to. I would very much like to have something back. And I don't think that the new GM which is probably being run by the same people, should profit by abandoning the old faithful ones. I think we are entitled to a higher priority and I very, very much like -- would like to get a little something, okay, Your Honor? I hope you understand and appreciate what I'm saying.

THE COURT: I do. Thank you. Okay. Are there other

Page 20 1 stockholders --2 MS. DITTMEIER: Are you there? 3 THE COURT: Yes. I am here, believe me and I heard 4 everything you said, Ms. Dittmeier. 5 Are there any other stockholders who wish to be heard 6 besides Mr. Hasson and Ms. Dittmeier? 7 MR. STERNIAK: Yes, my name is Edmond Sterniak. 8 THE COURT: Your name again, please, sir. MR. STERNIAK: Edmond Sterniak. 10 THE COURT: Oh, yes, Mr. Sterniak, forgive me. Okay. Go ahead, please. 11 12 MR. STERNIAK: Okay. So like the woman just stated, 13 you know, we stayed with it to the end. We put money in it and 14 they want to just throw us out and not give us anything but 15 already the new GM, they want to turn around and give 16 themselves bonuses already. 17 I can't see -- that should be criminal for them to do I mean they're taking from us. They knew they were in 18 trouble. We still stayed with them because we've always 19 20 been with them. I still drive General Motor vehicles. 21 We stay with them to the end. We show our faith. I 22 mean we do everything possible and they're just going to throw us out like nothing, like we're not even there? And they're 23 24 giving themselves bonuses again already. You know, what's to 25 stop them to keep from doing this and doing this over and over

Page 21 again? It's just not right. Like Mrs. Dittmeier said, I think 2 we should be given first priority of getting something back, 3 sir. 4 THE COURT: Fair enough, Mr. Sterniak. 5 Other folks who I haven't given a chance to --6 MR. STERNIAK: And I quess, you know, I'll leave it 7 at that, I guess. I just, you know, hopefully you can see 8 through this and, you know, award us a little something, anyway 9 because even myself, I lost less than Mrs. Dittmeier but, you 10 know, I spent what I lost -- you know, it was twenty years of 11 savings that I lost. 12 THE COURT: I understand, sir. 13 MR. STERNIAK: And I quess that's about all I have to 14 say, sir. 15 THE COURT: Very well. Thank you. Anybody who is in 16 the stockholder category who I haven't given a chance to be 17 heard yet? MR. TANCIAR: Yes, Your Honor. This is Ron Tanciar. 18 19 I would like to say a few words if I may. 20 THE COURT: Yes, you may, Mr. Tanciar. 21 MR. TANCIAR: Judge Gerber, just a couple of points. 22 First of all, I agree with everything that has been said and 23 you have my letter in front of you. I was kind of led to 24 believe that GM was going to go out with -- and do what Stemple

did in the early nineties when this country went through a

recess and that was to go out and raise money from our financial institutions across this nation and also issue new stock.

Well, unfortunately, that didn't transpire and being a GM retiree who spent over thirty years with the company, I was hoping that with good faith with the company and with loyal employees, such that they would come through and at least award us with the new stock that they issued.

And if my letter is in front of you, Your Honor, I did attach an article and the top of article says top GM executives received billions in stock prior to the IPO. So once again, you know, the big boys on the top, you know, try to run the company, do the right things, well they always have their pockets out first. And I would appreciate if the Court would listen to our grievances and hopefully you'll award the Court leave to -- at least maybe give us a portion of some of the new stock that has been issued. And that's about all I have to say, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. All right. Anybody else?

MR. SMOLINSKY: Your Honor, just -- Joe Smolinsky again. Just two points; the first point for the record, just to respond to that last comment, obviously as this court knows, new GM, the one that just had its IPO and went public is not under the watch of this court. It is a separate company from

Page 23 1 General Motors Corporation, now Motors Liquidation Company. 2 MR. TANCIAR: I understand that but the way I read 3 this was that the executives prior to the new stock being 4 issued, they were able to receive the stock. Now if they were 5 employed under the new GM, that I can't tell you. 6 THE COURT: Okay. 7 MR. SMOLINSKY: The second point I just want to 8 highlight, just responding to Ms. Dittmeier, I know she's 9 unfamiliar with the term equity or equity interests. If Your 10 Honor would like, I'd just --11 THE COURT: Yes. No, you're going to say that equity 12 interest is the word of art that's used in the Bankruptcy Code 13 that covers stock. 14 MR. SMOLINSKY: It's actually defined, Your Honor, in 15 Section 101.16 of the Code which says, "The term equity 16 interest means (a) share in a corporation, whether or not 17 transferrable or denominated stock or similar security." And that's what -- that's the definition that moves into the 18 19 priority scheme elsewhere in the Code. 20 THE COURT: Okay. Everybody standby for a minute, 21

please.

(Pause.)

THE COURT: I am now going to rule but before I do, I want to say that there have been many, many things in the GM bankruptcy case that have saddened me and the realities of what

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the law requires in this situation is one of them. Many, many employees have lost their jobs. Many, many creditors are getting only portions of what they're owed. Maybe if we're lucky, some of them will get thirty cents. That's still a loss for very many people.

I have had people coming in in wheelchairs who were victims of car wrecks who will be getting only small portions of what a jury might otherwise award them. And here we have three people who have spoken but who are only a small portion of what I suspect are tens of thousands of stockholders who have found that stock that they got, in many cases as part of their pension plans, turned out to be worthless when GM had the financial difficulties it did.

On this motion, I have old GM's motion to disallow claims by stockholders who were seeking the treatment that creditors get and to which Mr. Smolinsky said, and I understood both halves of what he said, that he had great sympathy but that he was required by law to follow the law. And unfortunately, I am in the same situation.

Although this issue is not hard from a viewpoint of bankruptcy law, the principles aren't as well known to people who aren't lawyers, even educated people. So I'm going to take a couple of minutes to layout the basis for my ruling which is unfortunately, that I am going to have to disallow these claims.

American bankruptcy law, and as far as I know, the bankruptcy law of every other country, as well, dishes out whatever a company has available to satisfy claims against it in the order of priorities. After certain special priorities are taken care of, most significantly for certain types of employee wages and taxes and a few other things, creditors then share based upon their claims, but the creditors must be paid in full before the next level which is stock can get paid. This is a slight oversimplification because sometimes there are different levels of priority among creditors and sometimes there are different levels of priority among stockholders.

Ms. Dittmeier commented on one of the obscure words of art that's used in bankruptcy. She said what are you talking about, equity interests? I'm a stockholder. That's a paraphrase of what she said but that's in substance the point she was making. And the answer is the one that Mr. Smolinsky, the lawyer for old GM said in his reply which is that equity interest is the word of art that bankruptcy uses to describe certain types of ownership of the company that are different from creditor claims, the most significant example of that being common stock which is what most of GM's equity holders had. Putting it another way, which is what most of GM's stockholders had.

Because the American system, for lack of a better word, says that you've got to pay creditors first, stockholders

can't be given anything out of the assets of an insolvent company like GM until the needs and concerns of the credits have been satisfied. And although I don't know the exact figures, I'm going to use a number by way of example. It looks like the creditors may be getting perhaps thirty cents in value on their claims on a dollar's claim which means they're going to lose seventy percent of their claims. And because of that, I'm not in a position to allow claims on behalf of stockholders because the creditors who are higher than they are in the order of priorities haven't been paid in full.

Now, Mr. Hasson raised a variant of that. Mr. Hasson didn't ask for payment as a stockholder alone but he said that GM owes him as a creditor rather than as a stockholder, because GM was guilty of what I'll call in shorthand, securities fraud, for failing to tell him all of the facts concerning General Motors Financial condition.

Assuming for the purposes of the analysis that GM was not fully truthful or fully disclosing its financial condition to its stockholder community and I don't make that finding but I simply assume it for the purpose of the analysis, the Bankruptcy Code has a special provision that deals with that and it's called 510(b). And it arises because for better or worse, securities fraud is fairly common in the cases that we bankruptcy judges see. And that if you could get a double recovery, once on your debt and a second time for the

securities fraud, you'd get a leg up over creditors if you were defrauded when you bought a debt security, like a bond or a note.

Under the same principle, if a stockholder who would normally have to get paid only after the creditors were paid in full, could in essence bootstrap that into a creditor claim, that stockholder would be getting a leg up over other stockholders who might have been subject to the same information and in any event, it would be a way of getting around the normal requirements of the Bankruptcy Code. And that's the reason why Congress in 1979 put in this provision, 510(b) which Mr. Smolinsky read at the beginning of the argument which is in substance, an anti-bootstrapping provision.

So folks, you've got to believe me when I say I know how you feel but as a matter of law, I just can't help you.

Stockholders can't get paid until creditors have been paid and I have thousands of creditors who haven't been paid in full.

In some cases, their personal circumstances, and I'm thinking especially of some of the car wreck victims but I'm sure there are many who put their life savings in bonds rather than stock, who suffered the same kinds of injury.

There are limits to how much I can help the people who invested in GM. And as a person who is sworn under the Constitution to comply with the law, I've got to apply the law.

So I'll say one more time, I really do understand your circumstances and I feel for you but under the law, my hands are tied. MS. DITTMEIER: But I understand that you've already ruled --THE COURT: And forgive me, I must continue. And for those reasons, the debtors' objections to these claims are sustained. Mr. Smolinsky, you are to settle an order in accordance with this oral ruling at your earliest reasonable convenience. I want you to triple the normal time that you give notice of settlement. Give the folks three weeks. You can use mail for that. The time to appeal my decision is going to run from the time of the entry of the order and not from the time that I've just dictated this decision and not from today. MR. SMOLINSKY: Thank you, Your Honor. We will. THE COURT: Okay. What's the next matter on the calendar? MR. SMOLINSKY: The next matter on the calendar, it's item 7 on the contested agenda is omnibus claims motion number There are two remaining claims under this objection. 179. The first is Kathryn Slade and the second is Larry Schramm. This is one of a number of claims filed against the estate seeking damage for prepetition loss of retiree benefits,

particularly healthcare and life insurance benefits.

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Page 29 1 MS. SLADE: Hello? 2 THE COURT: Hello? 3 MS. SLADE: The microphone went blank. 4 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Smolinsky --5 MR. SMOLINSKY: Should I try this one? 6 THE COURT: Yes, why don't you take that microphone 7 from the counsel table and I want you to do exactly what you're doing now, lift it up and hold it Oprah Winfrey style, just 8 9 keep that thing close to your mouth and see if they can hear 10 you better that way. 11 MR. SMOLINSKY: Let me try, Your Honor. Hopefully 12 this will work better. 13 THE COURT: Let me ask you to pause for a second, Mr. 14 Smolinsky. Could the folks on the phone hear him when he said 15 "Let me try it now, Your Honor?" 16 UNIDENTIFIED MALE SPEAKER: Yes, we could hear him. 17 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Go ahead, Mr. 18 Smolinsky. 19 MR. SMOLINSKY: Thank you, Your Honor. So this is 20 the 179th omnibus objecting to claims of Kathryn Slade and 21 Larry Schramm. 22 UNIDENTIFIED MALE SPEAKER: Hello? I cannot hear. 23 MS. SLADE: Hello. This is Kathryn. 24 THE COURT: Mr. Smolinsky, do the best you can but 25 forgive me folks, I can't just end my hearing because of

problems on the phone. I'm going to ask the lawyer to hold the microphone very close to his mouth but I have to move on with the hearing. Go ahead, Mr. Smolinsky.

MR. SMOLINSKY: Your Honor, prior to the petition date, General Motors Corporation modified certain of its benefit plans to reduce the cost of the benefits they're under. Subsequent to those modifications, the debtors after filing the bankruptcy entered into the master sale and asset purchase agreement, under which new GM, a newly formed company, agreed to assume those benefit plans as had previously been modified.

Your Honor, over the course of time, the General Motors Corporation benefit plans have been periodically modified and reduced. This is not the first time. Under ERISA, ERISA clearly holds that only vested benefits can't be changed. And the assumption is that these types of benefit plans, healthcare and life insurance benefit plans, are not vested unless there's a very strong statement indicating that there is an intent to treat those benefits as vested. In other words, not able to be changed.

To the contrary, Your Honor, each and every one of the General Motors Corporation plans provide clearly that they're subject to amendment or termination at any time in the company's discretion. That language which is cited in our papers also appears in virtually all of the various documents which the human resources department at General Motors

Corporation uses in their day-to-day activities.

Several courts, many courts, have confirmed that these types of plans are unvested and can be modified or terminated. The Sprague case, Sprague v. General Motors Corporation, that's a sixth circuit case, Moore v. Metro Life Insurance Company which is a second circuit case, those cases all hold that there needs to be a very strong statement that claims of these types of benefits, are vested in order to prohibit the company from being able to modify and terminate those plans when they need to.

So, Your Honor, we have two remaining objections for the 179th omnibus; Larry Schramm and Kathryn Slade. Both of them are long term -- long time employees of General Motors Corporation. Both are retirees.

Mr. Schramm concedes in his papers that General Motors Corporation reserved its rights to modify benefit plans, yet argues that for equitable reasons, they should not be allowed to modify those benefits because he wouldn't have retired had he known that those benefits were subject to change.

Kathryn Slade and, Your Honor, I believe she filed a supplemental response this morning, I don't know if Your Honor has it, we can hand it up if you don't.

THE COURT: I think I did, Mr. Smolinsky but I may have left it in my chambers. Go ahead.

MR. SMOLINSKY: We can hand up a copy, Your Honor. Ms. Slade similarly argues that her benefits should not be modified. She is continuing to get benefits as is Mr. Schramm from new GM although in the --THE COURT: But in the lesser amount --MR. SMOLINSKY: -- lesser --THE COURT: -- after the modification. MR. SMOLINSKY: That's correct, Your Honor. again, Your Honor, we sympathize with all of the retirees, employees, stockholders, but we are constrained. This is a liquidating estate. These benefits were properly modified. New GM agreed to assume those benefits that existed at the time of the bankruptcy. And we are constrained and have no ability to honor claims for damages resulting from a loss of those benefits. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Ms. Slade, my log shows that you may have signed up for the call. Are you on? MS. SLADE: I am on. Can you hear me? THE COURT: yes, I hear you pretty well. Would you like to argue? MS. SLADE: Well, Judge Gerber, my only argument is very similar to one of the earlier one around the stockholders claims. GM hourly and salaried management, as I gotten my statement this morning, have been taking these huge bonuses. GM old or new, it's all the same company in my opinion.

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are taking from the salaried retirees great amounts of money, at the same time profiting from our hardships and our sacrifices.

The only thing I guess I would really like to point out was the same as what Mr. Henderson said in his letter to the GM retirees back in June of '09.

THE COURT: You're talking about Fritz Henderson, the former CEO of the company?

MS. SLADE: Yes. But what he said was to continue to support GM and -- or we're going to have to sacrifice. Well, we will always continue to sacrifice as GM retiree in our medical and in our insurance. And we're still going to continue to sacrifice and the upper management scrapes in great heaps of money. I guess there's such an unfairness when you see what I put in and Larry put in thirty something years, all these other folks that have dedicated a life to a company who is still making profits and seriously, riding on some of the hard work that we performed and we're just being chucked by the wayside.

Sir, I understand you have to follow the letter of the law and if that's the way it goes, I understand, I accept that. I just appreciate being heard as a GM employee and as a fellow human being. That's all.

THE COURT: Okay. Thanks. Mr. Smolinsky, I made a note in my note --

MS. SLADE: Is anyone there?

THE COURT: Yes. The last thing I said was thank you, Ms. Slade or words to that effect. And then I was about to ask Mr. Smolinsky, the lawyer for old GM the name of the other person who is similarly situated which I didn't put in my notes. I want to ask if he wants to be heard on the phone also.

MR. SMOLINSKY: That's Mr. Schramm, Larry Schramm.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Larry Schramm, are you on the

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MR. SCHRAMM: Judge Gerber, this is Larry Schramm.

THE COURT: Would you like to be heard in argument

13 also?

MR. SCHRAMM: Please, if I could. I have just a couple of points I'd like to make.

THE COURT: Sure. Go ahead, sir.

MR. SCHRAMM: Even though they said during an earlier discussion, that ERISA does not provide for anything other than the pension part of it or the other welfare benefits as they call it. For my thirty-six, thirty-seven years at GM, over half of that time, there were no exclusions that I was aware of in the retirement package that GM put out almost every year to salaried employees, a total compensation statement. And included in that was figured in the retirement benefit that I was getting. That I'd be working for less money on a current

benefit to accrue some sort of benefit after I retire.

And that, along with what I was -- and the retirement that I took was based on, predicated on getting some sort of welfare benefit, you know, some of my other medical expenses and things paid for in retirement. And I early retired and it got changed. I have a hard -- it's hard for me to believe that the retirement was not the -- they knew what they were going to do prior to having you retired. And the termination systems (sic) that came into that, because I was notified by the program that I -- because of what happened, I was actually -- you know was not necessarily a voluntary retirement and by definition of the termination systems (sic).

THE COURT: Pause please, Mr. Schramm. GM's response says in substance that the disclosures to its employees all provided that there was an express disclosure of the fact that the plan could be modified or terminated by the employer and they said in their reply, and I'm looking at page 4 of their reply, that you don't dispute their right to amend or terminate in accordance with the terms. And then they go on to say but you're further arguing that because you retired, it shouldn't be subject to being changed after that.

Did your -- is it agreed on your part that your paperwork did have that right to modify or terminate or do you have some different document you want to show me?

MR. SCHRAMM: No. The -- I guess the question I have

Page 36 is was there a reason so they could get the retirement, so that 2 would be able to at that point in time change knowing -- did 3 they know at the time of my retirement that they were going to 4 make a change at that point, and find -- that's after I 5 retired. 6 THE COURT: When did you retire, sir? MR. SCHRAMM: October 2008. 7 8 THE COURT: 2008. 9 MR. SCHRAMM: Yes. 10 THE COURT: Was there any paperwork that you signed 11 when you retired that changed what they said about the right to 12 modify or terminate that had been in place before you retired? 13 MR. SCHRAMM: No, I had a standard retirement forms 14 to sign. 15 THE COURT: Okay. Anything else, Mr. Schramm? 16 MR. SCHRAMM: That's all. Thank you. 17 THE COURT: Thank you. Okay. Mr. Smolinsky, do you 18 wish to reply? MR. SMOLINSKY: No, Your Honor. I just want to make 19 20 one comment for Ms. Slade's benefit. I think she wrote in her 21 reply that she was concerned about her pension and I just want 22 to make clear that there were no modifications to the pension 23 plan that was assumed by new GM. So she doesn't have to worry 24 about these procedures here modifying those benefits.

THE COURT: When we talk about welfare plans, we're

Page 37 talking about retiree medical benefits? 1 MR. SMOLINSKY: Medical and life insurance. 2 3 THE COURT: Medical and life insurance. Okay. All 4 right. I think there were only two employees in this category, 5 am I correct or two retirees in this category? 6 MR. SMOLINSKY: On today's calendar, that's correct, 7 Your Honor. 8 THE COURT: Okay. 9 MR. SMOLINSKY: All relating to the same objection 10 which if the relief is granted, will resolve that objection. THE COURT: All right. Then stand in place for a 11 12 I'm going to rule on these. 13 Folks, once more I'm in the unhappy position of 14 having to comply with the law, notwithstanding the hardship 15 that my ruling will have on the two people who are affected 16 here who, in fact, may only be the most conscientious of a 17 larger group who were affected in a similar way. Here, GM -- old GM modified its retiree's medical and 18 life insurance benefits. Benefits of this type are described 19 20 in the law as welfare plans. Before the plans as modified 21 typically by providing for lesser benefits, were then assumed 22 by new GM, which would continue to perform under them but in a typically smaller way in the form of delivering benefits. 23 24 I do note and it's important to note as Mr. Smolinsky 25 clarified at the end, we're not talking about pensions.

talking about medical benefits which retirees normally get after they retire to cover them up until the time they get Medicare and sometimes to provide a supplemental benefit above what you'd get under Medicare.

It is undisputed, and we dealt with this back in June of 2009 when I got a request by some folks who were going to represent retirees, asking me to form a committee to represent their interest, it is undisputed that insofar as the retirees we're talking about here could be affected by this, that GM, now called old GM, had expressly provided in its plans and in the disclosures to its employees, that it reserved the right to terminate or modify their plans and its rights to do so were upheld by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in a case called Sprague v. General Motors.

That reservation was part of the contract, if you will, between the retiree and the employee. And while any time an employee loses the benefits, even in part, that's a hardship, it was part of the contract that I'm sworn to enforce as a judge.

Now it is some, but not total consolation that new GM agreed as part of its purchase agreement, to take on the remaining medical benefits in their modified form. But sadly, I'm not allowed to look at the hardship on any particular employee. I've just got to determine what are the rights of the parties because I have a responsibility not just to the

folks who were objecting, but to all of GM's other creditors, as well.

And there is only so much in the way of available value, if you will, to distribute to the entirety of old General Motors creditor community.

By the same token, it's clear that the undertaking that new GM took on was to take the welfare benefits only in their modified form which insofar as I'm aware is in every case, providing less in the way of benefits for the retiree than it used to provide.

Now Mr. Schramm makes a slight variant of the argument. He says that he wouldn't have retired if he thought that GM was going to do that to him. And he says that he thinks there was an intention to take away his benefits when he retired at the end of 2008 and that wasn't disclosed to him.

There has been no allegation, nor proof, that GM lied to him in that regard. At most, I have an argument that there just wasn't a disclosure of that type. However, given the rights that were reserved under the plan, I'm not in a position to find that that provides an exception to the general rule.

So for the same, in some ways, reasons as we had before, which is ultimately that I'm bound to comply with the law and notwithstanding its hardship on particular affected retirees, I must sustain the objection.

But Mr. Smolinsky, with the same procedural

requirements that I imposed on the stockholders, I want you to triple the amount of notice you're giving before you enter the order and I want to say in baby talk, say explicitly that the time to appeal does not run from today. It will run from the time of entry of the order. Ms. Slade, Mr. Schramm, I want to note for you and also for the stockholders if they're still on the phone, that the time to appeal from a decision of a bankruptcy court is much shorter than the time to appeal from an order of a district court. You've only got fourteen days. So just keep that in mind if you do decide that you want to appeal. Mr. Smolinsky, what's your next matter? MR. SMOLINSKY: Thank you, sir. I believe the next matters relate to Billy Ray Kidwell which I think you indicated you wanted to hold to the end of the hearing; is that correct, Your Honor? THE COURT: Yes, I don't see Mr. Kidwell on my call in log. And I don't see anybody who I would think might be Mr. Kidwell in the courtroom. Mr. Kidwell, are you on the phone? (No response.) THE COURT: No. Am I right that Mr. Kidwell isn't in the courtroom? (No response.) THE COURT: Right again. I've read the papers, Mr. Smolinsky, and am required to sustain old GM's objection and to

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grant new GM all of the requests new GM sought, as well with the exception of enjoining Mr. Kidwell from continuing his litigation. What I state in the way of a ruling on the merits, of course, will be stuff that either old GM or new GM could use if Mr. Kidwell chooses to continue his litigation elsewhere.

I was originally going to dictate a decision but my script, if you will, for it runs twelve pages and with him not on the call, my voice starting to give out already, I don't think I'm going to burden everybody with reading a twelve page script now. I think instead what I'm going to do is put a caption on it and just post it on ECF.

I guess I will hear argument by new GM as to my tentative or my instinct that I don't want to be enjoining litigants from raising issues. I mean the guy at least seemingly has a gripe with respect to a vehicle, a truck that has given him one nightmare after another. This isn't a Martin Tragona (ph.) type of situation in my view. You've got a guy who was upset and was trying to get his remedies and if he didn't do it the right way, I'm not of a mind to enjoin him from looking to the courts. I don't think he has a remedy but I'm not going to enjoin him.

Mr. Steinberg, do you want to argue that?

MR. STEINBERG: Good morning, Your Honor. I'm going to raise my voice, just in case someone on the phone needs to hear but it's not intended to be shouting at anybody.

THE COURT: Hopefully not me, among others.

MR. STEINBERG: Your Honor, I certainly am not shouting at you or anybody else. We did not move affirmatively in this court but we responded to Mr. Kidwell's motions that he had filed and he had filed numerous motions. The disputes with Mr. Kidwell have traversed the state courts in Florida, the federal district court in Florida, and now before Your Honor. And there have been appeals taken from the district court decision up and down to the circuit court level. I am not going to try to --

THE COURT: The circuit court of appeals or the Florida circuit court?

MR. STEINBERG: The circuit court of appeals. I am not going to try to argue with Your Honor's ruling that he should be enjoined from pursuing whatever remedy he thinks is appropriate. We do believe that based on Your Honor's ruling, that he should follow the appropriate procedures and we are to some extent, empathetic that he's a pro se litigant and therefore, he may not be fully familiar with exactly how to put forth what he believes is his grievance. But I am not here today to try to talk Your Honor out of your ruling on the injunction.

THE COURT: All right. Very well. Thank you. Then a written decision on Mr. Kidwell's various claims will be forthcoming out of my chambers in the next couple of days.

MR. SMOLINSKY: Thank you, Your Honor. We now move to the uncontested portion of the calendar. Your Honor, the first matter is a motion by the United States of America to approve a consent decree. If it's okay, I'll just handle that motion and Mr. Jones could make comments if necessary.

Your Honor, we continue to make progress on the environmental front. This consent decree is similar to ones that you've approved in the past as we continue to narrow the scope of the EPA's global claim filed in this case. This consent decree resolves five additional sites in New York, New Jersey and Indiana.

I believe Your Honor has actually signed an order approving this motion on Friday.

THE COURT: You anticipated the question I was going to ask to you or Mr. Jones, Mr. Smolinsky. I had been under the impression, unless I am confusing the settlement and I know that there have been a lot of environmental settlements, that on this one which involved if I recall, the Passaic River and perhaps the tribe upstate, involving the Messina plant, but I may have it confused with another was below the threshold for which the old GM estate needed my okay, that the U.S. government still needed my approval to make sure that the government was acting in accordance with the public interest but nobody had complained either in proceedings before the U.S. government or in this court contending that the government

hadn't done its job and I thought that I could therefore sign it without a hearing. And I think I did. Are we talking about the same one?

MR. SMOLINSKY: Yes, Your Honor. That's correct.

The government lodged the consent decree for comment period

like it has in the past and there were no objections. And Your

Honor was free to sign the order, although we did schedule it

for today.

There is one more companion stipulation that's referred to in the motion but wasn't attached and if I can, I would just like to spend a minute walking Your Honor through it.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. SMOLINSKY: We have done this in the past. As Your Honor may recall in connection with confirmation of the plan, the U.S. government asked that they reserve their rights with respect to setoff and the confirmation order so-provides.

Your Honor, may also recall that under the master sale and asset purchase agreement, the debtors transferred to new GM all rights to tax refunds. The issue in the stipulation which will be submitted to Your Honor in the next day or so, which I believe now has all of the requisite approvals, and Mr. Jones can speak to that, reserves the right to setoff the claims, certain portions of the claims, the 11.5 million dollars which is being provided to the government in connection

with the settlement against tax refunds that the government owns MLC and now new GM.

The debtors are somewhat in the middle here. The debtors just want to make sure that we don't end up in a situation where the government exercises a right of setoff and new GM or the government then seeks to get real dollars from us for violation of the master sale -- master purchase -- sale and purchase agreement.

So what the stipulation provides is that -- and the government is currently in negotiations with new GM over allowing the setoff to take place. The result of the setoff, if that agreement is reached, is that the claims against the estate will actually be reduced at no cost to the estate. So this is a benefit to the estate to the extent that the government could reach agreement with new GM.

But those discussions are not yet complete, so what the stipulation does is on account of the 11.5 million dollars which is being settled today, only a portion of that will be distributed today in the next quarterly distribution. The rest will be held in abeyance pending a determination as to whether that agreement with new GM is reached or not.

If an agreement is reached, the setoff will take place and the GUC Trust will not be responsible for making any further distributions on account of the consent decree. If that agreement is not reached, then the GUC Trust would go

ahead and make that distribution. So I wanted to put it on the record that from the GUC Trust perspective and from the Motors Liquidation Company's perspective, and I'd like Mr. Jones to confirm this, the impact of the stipulation is never to assert claims, additional claims against the estate or the GUC Trust but rather to potentially reduce the number of claims that could be asserted.

THE COURT: Let me hear from Mr. Jones and also if either wants, new GM or the GUC Trust to find out if anybody has any problems with what Mr. Smolinsky said. Mr. Jones, good morning.

MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honor. David Jones from the U.S. Attorney's Office for the government.

First to start with, Mr. Smolinsky's last point, that is correct. His characterization of the intended stipulation is correct, that serves simply for purposes of this case to alter what would otherwise be the distribution of the full 11.5 million settled claim amount in the next distribution, so that 2.5 million is being held back in anticipation of a potential offset recovery. There will be a distribution on account of a total of nine million on these five settled claims and then with the estate to simply hold back enough assets to permit an eventual unsecured distribution if the offset does not materialize. Otherwise, if we do achieve an offset recovery, we will notify the estate and the assets tied up for what would

be a distribution and that 2.5 million slice would then be freed up for other distributions or estate purposes.

As Mr. Smolinsky represented, I've been told by counsel for all the signatories to the stipulation and that's counsel for the state of Indiana, the state of New York, St. Regis Mohawk Tribe, and MLC and the GUC Trust, that they have authorizations needed to sign. I'll need a day or two to actually acquire a fully executed copy and submit it. But that's the -- I understand I have everyone's signoff that I need.

If I can, Your Honor, let me just backup to where we started which is that yes, the Court did enter an approval order and Your Honor's description of the status of this matter was absolutely correct. This is an unobjected to consent decree, and I'll specify regarding natural resource damage claims of the government. So these are brought federally on behalf of the Department of Interior and NOAA, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. These are to compensate for natural resource harms caused by contamination, whereas EPA claims, roughly speaking are for cleanup costs.

In part, these claims are brought jointly with cotrustees, namely the states that I just mentioned and the tribe that I just mentioned and therefore, the resolution is all bundled together. I can give the Court a quick update on what remains open in the environmental front with the government in

case that's helpful. On the natural resource damage front, there's only one site remaining unresolved. That's in Onondaga County, New York. We are attempting to negotiate a resolution of that and if we fail, I quess we'll have to come back to the Court and this --THE COURT: That's the site that engendered several confirmation objections if I recall --MR. JONES: Correct. THE COURT: -- in Onondaga County's, actually sending Onondaga's County attorney to argue, if I recall. MR. JONES: That is correct, Your Honor. And that same site is also open on the EPA side and it's really the EPA claim issues that have engendered most controversy involving a county more than the natural resource damage piece. But both the EPA and the natural resource damage elements of Onondaga remain open and we are working hard on trying to achieve a resolution. As perhaps that degree of interest suggests, it's a complicated and difficult site to resolve, but we're working. On the EPA side, there are only two other sites that remain unresolved, one is called Diamond Alkali in New Jersey. That's what Your Honor referred to as the Passaic River site. THE COURT: Oh, the last one I approved doesn't -- I thought that covered the Passaic River in part. MR. JONES: Sorry, Your Honor, it -- what Your Honor

just approved is --

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THE COURT: I come from New Jersey and the Passaic River is infamous.

MR. JONES: As the federal government, I don't think
I should use the word infamous to describe any body of water in
this great nation, Your Honor. But the settlement Your Honor
approved --

THE COURT: Let me say that I'm sympathetic to your desires to clean it up; is that better?

MR. JONES: Fair enough. So, are we. Yeah, let me be clear. Again, there's both EPA and NRD, Natural Resource Damage claims. The EPA piece is unresolved. So what Your Honor just approved was the Natural Resource Damage claim piece for Interior and NOAA but the EPA piece remains unresolved. And finally, the EPA piece resolves -- it remains unresolved at a site called Hayford Bridge (ph.).

So we're trying to close gaps on those remaining issues but other than that, I believe the environmental piece of the case is done with this settlement.

A specific request I would make, Your Honor, is that just as a formality, that the Court check and confirm that no one is objecting to this consent decree that was approved by order dated June 17, docket number 10453 because we did notice it for approval today. Nothing has been filed and I'm sure it's unopposed but just to make sure.

THE COURT: All right. Is there anybody in the

Page 50 courtroom who wants to be heard on that settlement between the 1 2 estate and the environmental regulatory authorities? 3 (No response.) 4 THE COURT: The record will reflect no response. 5 Anybody on the phone who wants to be heard on the wisdom of 6 that settlement? 7 MR. HASSON: Your Honor? 8 THE COURT: Yes, sir. 9 MR. HASSON: It's not a question -- this is Mr. 10 Hasson. 11 THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Hasson, go ahead. 12 MR. HASSON: Are we finished with our claims of 13 equity interest? 14 THE COURT: Yes, and I apologize to you, Mr. Hasson. 15 You're free to drop off the call if you want. Let me ask a 16 question before you do, Mr. Hasson. Mr. Smolinsky, am I right 17 that the estate is picking up the cost of the phone-ins for the 18 stockholders who objected? MR. SMOLINSKY: Yes, Your Honor. And to the extent 19 20 that that's not correct with respect to anyone who didn't know, 21 they could contact me at my offices and I'll arrange for it. 22 But I believe that we made those services available to the 23 individuals. 24 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Hasson, your having stayed on 25 the call didn't cost you any money but you're free to get of

Page 51 now if you choose to. 2 MR. HASSON: Okay. I do have one more question for 3 you. Can I? 4 THE COURT: Sure. 5 MR. HASSON: All right. So what you've done is 6 you've ruled on it that under the law we are to get nothing; is that correct? 7 8 THE COURT: In substance; yes. 9 MR. HASSON: And what about my situation with the 10 fraud? THE COURT: The same thing, that's why I talked about 11 12 510(b). 13 MR. HASSON: Right, the security fraud. Okay. I 14 don't know much about that 510(b). And you said that to appeal 15 the decision, you're going to give us three times the amount of 16 time. 17 THE COURT: Not the time to appeal, but what I am saying is that he's going to -- Mr. Smolinsky or somebody who 18 works for him is going to be drafting up an order for me to 19 20 review which, in essence, embodies the ruling. When that order 21 is entered, and I told him to take extra time to give you 22 plenty of notice that such an order would be forthcoming. 23 that order is entered, there's going to be a time prescribed by 24 law for you to appeal if you want to. And as best I recall, 25 that time is fourteen calendar days.

Page 52 1 MR. HASSON: And we will we be notified to that 2 effect? 3 THE COURT: Yes, sir. 4 MR. HASSON: Okay. THE COURT: Okay. 5 6 MR. HASSON: All right. I'm going to drop out now. 7 THE COURT: Very well. 8 MR. HASSON: Thank you. 9 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Jones, you may continue. 10 MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honor. I had very little else but I did want to note for the record that the consent 11 12 decree refers to a government omnibus environmental proof of 13 claim number of 64064 and that has subsequently been amended to 14 claim number 71118. The stipulation applies fully to the claim 15 as amended. So I just wanted to note that clarification for 16 the record. 17 Subject to that, Your Honor, and with the observation of no objections today, we don't think there's anything further 18 for the Court to do. The order as entered is all we need and 19 20 we thank the Court for its consideration. 21 THE COURT: All right. Well, obviously nothing has 22 come to my attention that would cause me to change my view that 23 when I signed it. Do you think either -- you don't need to be 24 diplomatic -- for the sake of good order, you would like me to 25 reenter the order or issue some supplemental thing to say I

Page 53 1 meant it or my thinking hasn't change or whatever? 2 MR. JONES: Your Honor, I think that's unnecessary 3 with the state of the record as it now is, unless if the Court 4 prefers, we're happy to submit a slightly modified proposed 5 order that the Court could --6 THE COURT: I would prefer not to embarrass myself or 7 the United States Federal Courts by issuing a new order if you're satisfied that the old one skins the cat. 8 9 MR. JONES: We're satisfied. I consulted internally 10 and was advised to seek the clarifications that we achieved on the record and I think we're set. 11 12 THE COURT: Fair enough. 13 MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honor. Oh, and Your 14 Honor, may I be excused for the balance of the hearing? 15 THE COURT: Yes, you may, Mr. Jones. Was somebody 16 speaking to me at the same time Mr. Jones was? I don't hear 17 anything now. 18 Mr. Steinberg? MR. STEINBERG: Yes, Your Honor. I had appeared for 19 20 the Kidwell matter, is now concluded, I would just like to be 21 excused. 22 THE COURT: Sure. 23 MR. STEINBERG: Thank you, Judge.

24 THE COURT: Just look for ECF. Something will be 25 coming out very quickly.

MR. STEINBERG: Thank you.

MR. SMOLINSKY: Your Honor, again, Joe Smolinsky.

The next matter on the calendar is an application by AP

Services for the payment of certain discretionary fees. We did

not file that application with the Court but if Your Honor

will, I'd like to just present it for approval.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. SMOLINSKY: Under this application, AP Services, LLC seeks authorization to pay certain discretionary bonuses under its third amended engagement letter that was approved by this court on September 17, 2010. There are three components to the payments that are all based on milestones that have been achieved under that engagement letter.

The first is a seven million dollar payment for achieving the goal of confirming a Chapter 11 plan. There is an additional 2.5 million that is due as a result of distributing seventy percent of the common stock and warrants which were done in the first distribution. I believe we distributed approximately seventy-five percent of the securities at the first distribution date.

And the third is based on the total amount of claims at the end of the case. There is a discretionary payment of between 2.5 million and five million dollars that get paid as the claims go down below forty-two billion dollars and then down to the low point of thirty-five billion where they would

earn the full five million. To date, they're entitled 2.5 million of that payment, so they seek authorization to pay that, as well. Those payments total twelve million dollars.

Your Honor, no one in the trenches in this case could disagree with the conclusion that AP Services has acted in a first rate manner with utmost integrity and exemplary in every respect in this case. And personally, I couldn't imagine a better steward for the assets of these estates.

The fee examiner filed a statement of no objection with respect to the application, although I guess there was a question as to whether it fell within his jurisdiction but he nevertheless noted that he had no objection.

And I believe, Your Honor, although Mr. Masumoto is in the courtroom, that the U.S. Trustee has indicated that it has no objection to the payment of these fees which were approved previously by Your Honor but subject to coming back and seeking now authorization to pay.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Masumoto, do you wish to be heard?

MR. MASUMOTO: No, Your Honor. We have no objection.

THE COURT: All right. And am I correct that no objections have been expressed by anybody, Mr. Smolinsky?

MR. SMOLINSKY: That's correct, Your Honor. There have been no objections.

THE COURT: All right. They're approved.

MR. SMOLINSKY: Your Honor, items number three and four on the uncontested calendar involve two claims, two series of claims that we're seeking to expunge for breach of the ADR procedures. We do not bring these motions, these objections arbitrarily. We've tried on many times and circumstances to get these claimants to engage in the ADR procedures.

And as Your Honor is aware, those ADR procedures have proved very successful in trying to manage the thousands of primarily product liability claims that exist against the estate. We recognize that expungement of the claims for failure to comply with the ADR procedures is a harsh remedy but this should come as no surprise to the claimants.

I just want to read into the record from the ADR procedures themselves, that were the subject of several court hearings and this court's approval. Section 4(f) of the -- I'm sorry, Section F of the Procedures called Failure to Comply with the ADR Procedures states:

"If a designated claimant or the debtors fail to comply with the ADR procedures, negotiate, in good faith or cooperate as may be necessary to effectuate the ADR procedures, the bankruptcy court may after notice and a hearing, find such conduct to be in violation of the ADR order or with respect to a designated claimant, an abandonment of or failure to prosecute the designated claim or both."

"Upon such findings, the bankruptcy court may, among

other things, disallow and expunge the designated claim in whole or in part or grant such other and further remedy deemed just and appropriate under the circumstances including without limitation, awarding attorneys fees, other fees and costs to the other party."

The first is item number three on the agenda. That's an objection to claim number 1038 filed by the personal representative of Valier Torres Rodriguez. The second is a series of five claims. It's claim number 39218, 39219, 39220, 39221 and 39222 filed by Carla Scott, Ryan Hawkins and Barbara Hawkins.

In the case of the Rodriguez claims, all efforts to contact counsel have proven to be completely ignored. We left several voicemails without response. In our papers, Your Honor, we listed all of the times that we reached out to them in an effort to try to get them to respond to the initial offer which is the first step in the ADR procedures.

After filing this objection, we again called Mr. Pendras (ph.), who is counsel to the claimant and left a message and there was no response.

In the case of Scott Hawkins, which is item number four -- the Scott Hawkins claims which is item number four, we had a little bit more response from these claimants but at the end, we scheduled two mediations and at the very last minute, they told us that they didn't want to appear at the mediations.

I don't know if this is --

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THE COURT: Are the Hawkins' pro se or do they have a 3 lawyer?

MR. SMOLINSKY: They have a lawyer, Your Honor. me just confirm that. Your Honor, the proofs of claim reflect the fact that payments should be made to Gary, Williams, Finney Lewis, Watson & Sperando in Stuart, Florida and they were provided notice, as well.

So these are claims that were geared up. Apparently both parties were aware that mediations were scheduled and at the last minute, there was a cancellation and a failure to appear. We don't know what else to do at this point but to seek to expunge the claim. And we've had no response to this objection by those claimants, similar to the representative of Valerie Torres Rodriguez.

THE COURT: Let me tell you what's -- and I take it neither of them responded to your motion before me today.

> That's correct, Your Honor. MR. SMOLINSKY:

THE COURT: Let me tell you what's bothering me about this, Mr. Smolinsky. Defaulting in the ADR procedures walks, talks and quacks like malpractice on behalf of a lawyer who should be representing his clients. And because these lawyers did not do something as basic as this, their clients are going to be the ones who are victimized -- don't hold me to the figure but thirty cents on the dollar for whatever you

ultimately fix as the claimant's loss is still a lot better than zero. And I am not in a position today, of course, to find that these guys are guilty of malpractice. They're kind of like Potter Stewart and pornography, I know it when I see it. And I cannot understand how any responsible lawyer can do this to his client.

But I as a judge am troubled by penalizing the clients for their lawyer's failure to step up to the plate and participate in these procedures. I don't want to understate the importance of them. We couldn't run this Chapter 11 case without the ADR procedures but the clients are going to be the victims, not the lawyers unless we can be creative here in some way.

MR. SMOLINSKY: Your Honor, we're prepared to be creative. I want to note that it's not only the lawyers that could potentially be the roadblock here. It might actually be the lawyer's inability to obtain the requisite cooperation from their clients.

So I don't know that you can draw that conclusion firmly but what we can do is we can settle the order and we can attach to it a letter and we could serve not only the lawyer's but the claimants and tell them in plain English that a result of this order being entered, they will have no further claims in this case and give a phone number to call prior to a certain date in order to respond if they so choose.

Beyond that, I think that we fully and amply provided evidence that we've tried and tried and tried and gave this a lot of patience and cooperation with this court to make sure that we don't enter these orders lightly.

THE COURT: Well I'm confident you're not entering it lightly, Mr. Smolinsky. My problem isn't with the way the estate has handled it. It's with the clients who may have been victimized by the way their lawyers were failing to serve them.

I am going to go along with your request but I want you to add a paragraph to your proposed order which is that the lawyers for each of these guys are to forthwith call chambers for an on the record conference call at which they will explain to the Judge personally why they failed to comply with the procedures and how they thought they were serving their client's interests by failing to do so. And why the Court should not send a letter to the disciplinary authorities in which they practice law, in the jurisdictions in which they practice law, reporting these circumstances and reporting how their clients were prejudiced by their failure to do what the ADR order required.

And forgive me for raising my voice, Mr. Smolinsky.

I'm raising it to the wrong guy but this really bothers me and again, I apologize to you or anybody else in the room who was obviously the wrong person to hear this message.

MR. SMOLINSKY: Not offended at all, Your Honor.

Page 61 1 Thank you. 2 THE COURT: All right. 3 MR. SMOLINSKY: Anything else on that matter, Your 4 Honor? 5 THE COURT: No, sir. Thank you. 6 MR. SMOLINSKY: The next matter on the agenda is a --7 THE COURT: Oh, one last thing, Mr. Smolinsky, put 8 that stuff that I told you to add in bold in the proposed order. 10 MR. SMOLINSKY: And how long would you like for us to settle that order? 11 12 THE COURT: Whatever you think is fair but perhaps a 13 little extra time might be in order because frankly, I am not 14 looking to impose sanctions. I'm looking to get compliance. 15 MR. SMOLINSKY: And we're not looking to enter orders 16 and then have to vacate them if --17 THE COURT: Yes, I understand. 18 MR. SMOLINSKY: -- there's an appropriate response. 19 Your Honor, item five on the uncontested agenda is a motion for 20 relief from the stay by the Roman Catholic Dioceses of 21 Pittsburgh and the Transfiguration Parish. We have agreed to 22 lift the stay. We have a stipulation which we will submit to chambers for consideration. 23 24 THE COURT: Sure. MR. SMOLINSKY: The last matters, Your Honor, are all 25

Page 62 new omnibus objections. That is items number six through 2 eighteen on the uncontested agenda. We had very few responses 3 with respect to these matters and as usual, we'd like to go 4 ahead and submit an order for those parties who did not respond 5 and we will adjourn to the next hearing those claimants who did 6 file either formal or informal responses. 7 THE COURT: Very well. 8 MR. SMOLINSKY: Your Honor, I believe that concludes 9 the agenda. 10 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much. 11 MR. SMOLINSKY: Thank you. 12 THE COURT: Have a good day. We're adjourned. 13 (Whereupon these proceedings were concluded at 11:22 a.m.) 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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Page 64 1 2 CERTIFICATION 3 I, Linda Ferrara, certify that the foregoing transcript is a 4 5 true and accurate record of the proceedings. Digitally signed by Linda Ferrara Linda 6 DN: cn=Linda Ferrara, o, ou, email=digital1@veritext.com, **Ferrara** c=US 7 Date: 2011.06.24 10:50:01 -04'00' 8 LINDA FERRARA 9 10 Veritext 11 200 Old Country Road 12 Suite 580 13 Mineola, NY 11501 14 15 Date: June 23, 2011 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25